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‘Tis but thy name that is my enemy; 
Thou art thyself, though not a Montague. 
What’s Montague? it is nor hand, nor foot, 
Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part 
Belonging to a man.  O, be some other name! 
What’s in a name? that which we call a rose 
By any other name would smell as sweet; 
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call’d, 
Retain that dear perfection which he owes 
Without that title.  Romeo, doff thy name;  
And for that name, which is no part of thee, 
Take all myself.   
 
-William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, II.ii 
To Shakespeare’s Juliet, it seemed that all that stood between her and her one true 
love was a name.  Of course, it was not just the name of the unique entity that the name 
‘Romeo Montague’ denoted that kept Romeo and Juliet from being together, you might 
say; it was the whole history of dispute between their two families, which would remain 
the same whatever they were named.  Yet it is that name that signifies who Romeo is, and 
of what house, which connects him essentially to that conflict between families.   
In elementary school, one is taught that a proper name is the name of a unique 
entity.  Such a fact is easily taken for granted when one is ten years old—or twenty, or 
eighty for that matter!—but a puzzling situation arises when one re-examines this 
grammatical tidbit and asks oneself: what exactly determines what a proper name stands 
for?  Is it completely arbitrary, as Juliet would have us believe, or is there some other 
3connection between a name and that which it names?  How is it that I can say ‘Romeo 
Montague’ names the unique entity that is the man Romeo Montague?1
When we speak ordinarily, we take it for granted that we succeed in referring to 
that person or that event simply by using its name.  But upon reexamination, it is unclear 
exactly what connects a name to its reference (i.e. that which the name stands for), and 
how we know what one another means when someone utters a name.  The issue of what a 
proper name stands for could seem trivial at first glance; however, the relation of a name 
to its reference serves as a model for how language in general relates to the world as it 
actually is.  It is a vital epistemological question, with very interesting consequences.   
Consider the following situation: in Nepal, Hindus and Nepalese Buddhists 
worship Kumari, who is a living Hindu deity.  Kumari is a prepubescent girl who is the 
bodily incarnation of the goddess Taleju.  Kumari is literally a deity to many Nepalese 
people until the day of her first menstruation, after which the goddess vacates her body 
and she is no longer Kumari. But who is she? This de-naming poses real psychological, 
and social and economic problems for the physical being (girl) who used to be the deity 
named ‘Kumari.’  So we are left with many questions: who is this ‘Kumari,’ what does 
her name mean, and how can its meaning change so abruptly? 
In this essay I will explore the different views of proper names that have arisen 
over the years, and various problems posed by each of them.  In light of all these 
arguments and criticisms, I have sought to create a picture of naming that stays true to 
our ordinary idea and use of naming.  I will argue that names do not just denote; rather, 
 
1 Throughout this essay when a proper name is written in inverted commas, such as ‘Romeo Montague,’ I 
am talking about the name, and when a proper name is written without inverted commas, such as Romeo 
Montague, I am talking about the thing itself (this example assumes that Romeo is a real person, and not 
just a fictional character). 
4they have informational content that can be thought of as necessarily connected to a 
name, considering that the causal chain of communicative acts that associated that 
information with a certain name happened as they did. 
 
i. A starting point 
 
For many years, thinking about reference in the philosophy of language was 
dominated by John Stuart Mill’s theory that “there is no more to a name’s meaning than 
its role of designating something.”2 Mill wrote: “proper names are not connotative: they 
denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any 
attributes as belonging to those individuals.”3 The problem with a view such as Mill’s is 
that it becomes difficult to determine what the reference of a name is.  How is one to use 
a name to refer if it lacks descriptive content?4 It is useless to say ‘Stephen Hawking’ 
without having some sort of description (e.g. ‘the 17th Lucasian Professor of 
Mathematics’) to identify who one is talking about.  
 
ii. Mill’s problems 
 
This problem, however, was not the main reason that most philosophers of 
language eventually rejected Mill’s theory.  Rather, it was the concerns of Frege (1893) 
 
2 Devitt, Michael.  “Millian and description theories of proper names,” Routledge. 
3 Mill, J.S. A System of Logic, 20. 
4 Kripke’s question, Naming and Necessity, 28. 
5and Russell (1911) about identity statements that revealed the shortcomings of a 
denotative-but-not-connotative view.  Consider the classic criticism of Mill’s theory: 
 When the ancient Greeks observed the planet Venus, they assumed it to be two 
different stars, one that rose in the morning, which they called ‘Phosphorus,’ and one that 
rose in the evening, which they called ‘Hesperus.’  Given that we now know that 
‘Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus’ are the same planet, we can write the following true identity 
statements: 
(1) Hesperus is Hesperus. 
(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
 
What is the difference between the (1) and (2)?  Philosophers have made several 
arguments about the difference between the two.  Some say that (1) is analytic whereas 
(2) is synthetic.  Some claim that (1) is known a priori while (2) is known empirically.  
And some claim that (1) is necessary while (2) is contingent.  “However, probably the 
most influential reason for thinking that the statements differ in meaning has been 
Frege’s claim that they differ in ‘cognitive value,’” meaning that while (1) is a “trivial 
piece of logical knowledge,” (2) is “highly informative, revealing an important 
astronomical discovery.”5
The point of agreement in all these opinions is that (1) and (2) differ in meaning.  
This difference can only be explained if one is to attribute different meanings to 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus.’  Mill’s theory takes both names to have the same meaning, 
 
5 Devitt 
6since both ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ designate the planet Venus.  Thus, Mill’s theory 
seems to be wrong, as simple denotation does not expend the meaning of the name.6
A further problem with Mill’s theory arises when one is confronted with existence 
statements.  Think about the statement ‘Vulcan7 does not exist.’  This statement is true.  
But since there is no Vulcan, the name ‘Vulcan’ does not designate anything.  In keeping 
with Mill’s theory, ‘Vulcan does not exist’ should be partly meaningless.  Obviously, 
‘Vulcan does not exist’ is not meaningless; it could not be true otherwise!  Again, Mill’s 
theory fails to give an appropriate view of proper names.8
iii. Frege on identity, and names 
 
I noted that Frege’s claim that (1) and (2) differ in ‘cognitive value’ was the most 
influential reason for thinking that the statements differ in meaning.  To begin this 
inquiry, let us consider some of Frege’s thoughts regarding identity statements, which 
will serve as a background for his alternative theory of names. 
Consider this: how is it that a true identity statement, such as ‘a = b’ can be 
informative?  An expression is informative, at least loosely, if it gives ‘facts’ or 
communicates knowledge of something, usually with the assumption that the information 
given is new knowledge to the person receiving it.  Frege thought that to express 
informative, proper knowledge through identity, as in ‘a = b’, the signs ‘a’ and ‘b’ have 
to designate the same thing.  Frege considers ‘a’ and ‘b’ to be different modes of 
presentation of one designator.  He distinguishes between what he calls the Sinn (‘sense’) 
 
6 Devitt 
7 Vulcan is the mythical planet once believed to be between the Sun and Mercury. 
8 Devitt 
7and the Bedeutung (‘reference’) of a sign; the Sinn is what contains the mode of 
presentation, and the Bedeutung is that to which the Sinn refers.  Essentially, the Sinn is 
an objective way of thinking about a thing.  Frege uses the example of the planet Venus.  
Venus is known both as the ‘morning star’ and as the ‘evening star.’  The Beudeutung of
‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ is the same (Venus), but the Sinn is not.   
 Returning to our true identity statement ‘a = b,’ if we were to follow Frege’s line 
of thinking, ‘a’ and ‘b’ would be two different Sinn of a single Bedeutung, i.e. two 
different ways of expressing a single reference.  Such a statement could be informative in 
that it reveals that two signs which differ in cognitive value are simply different ways of 
expressing the same thing. 
 The concept of proper names is inextricably linked with Frege’s  idea of Sinn and 
Bedeutung. For Frege, a ‘Proper Name’ combines ordinary proper names like ‘Paris’ or 
‘Stephen Hawking’ and definite descriptions, like ‘the capital city of France’ or ‘the 17th 
Lucasian Professor of Mathematics’ into one category of singular terms.  These names 
are linguistic signs, simple (one word) or complex (a phrase), that express the sense of 
their reference.9
A name is the actual word(s), the letters and the sound, while a sense might be 
best understood as the thought that particular word(s) elicit when they are comprehended 
by the person reading or hearing them.  For example, the name ‘Paris’ is a linguistic sign 
that expresses an objective way of thinking about a thing, in this case Paris10 itself.  To 
 
9 What I  have so far referred to as Sinn and Bedeutung I will now refer to as sense and reference, 
respectively, to universalize Frege’s concept. 
10 In an extension of footnote 1, when I write ‘Paris’ in inverted commas, I am talking about the name and 
the sense, as opposed to the thing itself (that big sprawl of buildings on the Seine), which is written simply 
as Paris.  The thing itself (Paris) is the reference. I will continue to use this method to distinguish between 
name/sense and reference. 
8clarify: ‘the capital city of France’ is also a sign which expresses an objective way of 
thinking about Paris.  ‘Paris’ and ‘the capital city of France’ are two signs which express 
two senses of Paris.  It might appear that there is not much difference between these two 
senses, and indeed they are not much different.  But if one considers that ‘the big sprawl 
of buildings on the Seine’ and ‘the urban center often called “the city of love”’ are two 
more senses of Paris, one can see the difference a bit better.  The two names elicit two 
slightly different ways of thinking about Paris. 
 
iv. Problems with Frege’s theory 
 
Frege wrote that “by… ‘name’ I have here understood any designation 
representing a proper name, which thus has as its reference a definite object.”11 The 
‘Basic Problem’12 with Frege’s theory of Sinn and Bedeutung is that it relies on object-
invoking proper names.  Proper-name treatments are vulnerable ‘to the fact that the world 
may not oblige with the object they wish to invoke.’13 There of course might not be an 
object, or there might be an infinite number of objects for which it is impossible to assign 
proper names to all of them.  Frege does recognize this problem, and he suggests that it 
can be solved by assigning some arbitrary object, like the number zero, to serve as the 
semantic value.  For example, the planet Venus would serve as the semantic value of the 
name ‘Venus,’ but the semantic value of ‘Vulcan’ would be 0; the intuition is that in 
 
11 Frege, Gottlob.  ‘On Sense and Reference.’  Reprinted in Translations from the Writings of Gottlob 
Frege, 57. 
12 McCulloch, Game of the Name, 44. 
13 McCulloch, 44. 
9assigning an arbitrary object as a substitute for nothing, one can give names of non-
existent things references.14 
Russell, however, was not satisfied by the artificiality of such a solution, which 
essentially ‘[loses] all contact with linguistic reality.’15 McCulloch writes that Russell’s 
theory of descriptions is ‘an alternative treatment of propositions containing descriptions 
which is explicitly designed to avoid the Basic Problem [that there might not be any or 
are too many objects corresponding to a proper name].’16 If one does not need to invoke 
an object in accounting for a description, there is no ‘Basic Problem.’   
Before we look at how Russell goes about treating descriptions, however, it is 
important to note that he disagrees with Frege about the essential nature of names as they 
relate to that which they stand for.  Russell claims that logicians are too often misled by 
grammar, and that they ‘[regard] grammatical form as a surer guide in analysis than, in 
fact, it is.’17 Because there is no ‘apparatus of propositional functions,’ he thinks, ‘many 
logicians have been driven to the conclusion that there are unreal objects.’18 For 
example, because we can speak about ‘the golden mountain,’ ‘the round square,’ or 
‘Vulcan’ in a meaningful, and even true, way, it is argued that they must be some sort of 
logical being, or else the propositions would be meaningless.   
Russell, however, thinks that logicians should be more mindful of reality, and the 
fact that there is nothing that is unreal.  He argues that descriptions, either definite or 
indefinite, describe either something real (whether it be an object, a figment of the 
 
14 McCulloch, 45. 
15 McCulloch, 46. 
16 McCulloch, 47. 
17 Russell, ‘On Denoting,’ 47. 
18 Russell, 47. 
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imagination, or something else) or nothing, but never something unreal.19 Because of the 
difficulties created by the need for sense and reference in a significant denoting phrase 
(which would include all those expressions which Frege would have categorized as 
names), he thinks we cannot always maintain the connection between sense and 
reference.   
Russell notes that the common way of speaking about the sense20 of a denoting 
phrase, as opposed to its reference, is to use inverted commas, as in: 
The Golden Rule is a maxim, not a denoting phrase. 
‘The Golden Rule’ is a denoting phrase, not a maxim. 
Once we see this, we can see that “the difficulty which confronts us is that we cannot 
succeed in both preserving the connexion of meaning and denotation and preventing 
them from being one and the same; [and] also that the meaning cannot be got at except by 
means of denoting phrases”21 in the following way: 
 Say I want to know what a denoting phrase, such as ‘the Golden rule,’ means (i.e. 
what its reference is).  Let  
‘G’ = ‘the Golden Rule’; this makes  
G = do unto others what you would have others do unto you 
If I don’t know what the reference of ‘G’ is, presumably I want to know the meaning of 
the word(s), not the reference.  But if I were to talk about ‘the meaning of G’ I am talking 
about the meaning of the reference, not of the denoting phrase.  To talk about the 
meaning of the word(s), I would have to talk about ‘the meaning of “G”’.  Talking about 
 
19 i.e. even if you are describing something we usually think of as unreal, it actually can be thought of as a 
real thing; e.g. a unicorn can be thought of as a figment of the imagination, which is a real thing. 
20 Russell  refers to ‘sense’ and ‘reference’ as ‘meaning’ and ‘denotation,’ respectively. 
21 Russell, 49. 
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‘the meaning of the Golden Rule’ (the reference G) is not the same as talking about ‘the 
meaning of “the Golden Rule”’ (the denoting phrase, ‘G’).  So if I want to know the 
meaning of the words, I have to ask about “the meaning of “G”’, which is ‘G’ itself; in 
other words, the meaning (what the words ‘G’ denote) is the same as G, which does not 
give us any new information.  If we do not know the meaning of the word(s) in the first 
place, we have not gotten anywhere!22 
Russell’s aim in noting the problems with needing a sense and a reference to give 
meaning is to point out that the relation of sense to reference ‘remains wholly 
mysterious.’  He rejects Frege’s definite description paradigm of referring expressions in 
favor of the notion of a name in the ‘narrow logical sense,’ which takes ‘genuine’ names 
to refer in some ‘mysterious, unanalysable and absolutely direct way to their referents.’23 
Yet this leaves us still in need of some sort of account of how ordinary names work.  
Russell considers a theory of description the best way to explain the use of names.  From 
this judgment, Russell revises the theory of descriptions to remedy the ‘Basic Problem’ in 
a way that remains consistent with linguistic reality. 
 
v. Another way of thinking about names 
Russell’s most important claim is that to make a statement significant, it needs a 
concept (something like that which we are calling a sense), but not necessarily a 
constituent (reference).  He does this rather simply by rewriting descriptive propositions 
using basic quantifiers (‘everything’ and ‘something’) and logical particles. In ‘On 
Denoting,’ he uses the proposition 
 
22 Russell, 49. 
23 Donnellan ‘Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions,’ 338. 
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The father of Charles II was beheaded 
This proposition can be restated as 
Not everything failed to beget Charles II; and any begetter of Charles II is the 
same as any other; and whatever begat Charles II was executed.24 
The basis for this formulation is that a proposition ‘the G is H’ is true if and only 
if 
(i) at least one thing is G
(ii) at most one thing is G
(iii) whatever is G is H
This formulation can be written symbolically as 
 (RUS)  ‘the G is H’ = ‘x (y(GyP x = y) & Hx)’ 
 This sort of paraphrase is T if and only if conditions (i)-(iii) hold, which is to say 
that they are T if and only if ‘the G is H’ is T.  This formulation allows one to make 
significant propositions (that are T or F, not meaningless) without appealing to an object.  
For example: 
 The present King of France is bald 
can now be written as  
 x (y(KyP x = y) & Bx)
where K = x is the present King of France, and B = x is bald.  This statement turns out to 
be F, since nothing is T for the function  
 y(KyP ___ = y) & B__.
Thus, Russell’s quantificational formulation solves the ‘Basic Problem’ without having to 
appeal to an artificial reference. 
 
24 This is McCulloch’s restatement (47).  It says what Russell wanted to say in his restatement, but with 
clearer language. 
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We have seen that Frege included both natural names and definite descriptions 
into the category of ‘Proper Names.’  We have also seen that according to Frege’s theory 
of Sinn and Bedeutung both natural names and definite descriptions fall victim to the 
‘Basic Problem.’  To avoid this problem, Russell included natural names and definite 
descriptions in a single category of descriptions (as opposed to a category of singular 
terms)25. He included natural names in the category of descriptions because he thought 
of them not just as simple signs for things, but as abbreviated descriptions. If a natural 
name can be treated quantificationally, then it, like a definite description, can avoid the 
‘Basic Problem’ of reference.   
So, how is it that one can treat natural names as descriptions? Russell writes: 
The names that we commonly use, like ‘Socrates’, are really abbreviations for descriptions.  
…When we use the word ‘Socrates’ we are really using a description.  Our thought may be 
rendered by some such phrase as ‘The master of Plato’, or ‘The philosopher who drank the 
hemlock’, or ‘The person whom logicians assert to be mortal’, but we certainly do not use the 
name as a name in the proper sense of the word26 (‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’, p.201). 
 
It is this rendering that can then be rewritten in quantificational language.  For instance, 
the proposition ‘Socrates was mortal’ becomes ‘The philosopher who drank the hemlock 
was mortal,’ which can be restated as ‘One and only one thing is a philosopher who 
drank the hemlock, and whatever is a philosopher who drank the hemlock was mortal’ 
(and symbolized as x (y(PwdHyP x = y) & Mx)).27 
The intuition in this statement of Russell’s seems to be that natural names are 
synonymous with quantificational descriptions, which is actually very similar to Frege’s 
view of proper names. 
 
25 Russell also included indefinite descriptions in this category.  Indefinite descriptions usually take the 
form ‘a something’, and can used to talk about a class of things, while definite descriptions, which usually 
take the form ‘the something’, are used to talk about unique things. 
26 Which is the ‘narrow logical sense’ noted above. 
27 McCulloch, 51. 
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vi. The descriptive theory of naming 
 
What is particularly interesting about the question of what exactly determines 
what a proper name stands for is that it brings together “two classical but opposing 
paradigms for referring expressions.”28 Frege and Russell are representative of these two 
paradigms, which are definite description and names in the narrow, logical sense, 
respectively.   As Donnellan notes, both paradigms lead to the same theory about proper 
names.  Despite the fact that they differ in opinion about what names (as genuine 
referring expressions) are and how they refer, both Frege and Russell adhere to a widely 
accepted view that is usually called the ‘descriptivist’ theory of names, also known as the 
‘principle of identifying descriptions.’   
The basic idea behind the descriptivist theory is that a) the user(s) of a proper 
name must be able to supply a set of ‘non-question-begging’29 descriptions that identify 
the who or the what the name refers to, and b) the referent of a proper name (if there is 
one) is the thing that uniquely fits that set of identifying descriptions.  Thus one may 
know the reference of the name ‘Stephen Hawking’ by finding out that individual who is 
picked out by ‘the 17th Lucasian Professor of Mathematics,’ ‘the author of A Brief 
History of Time,’ etc.  Basically, the fulfillment of the description(s) determines what the 
proper name stands for. 
 
28 Donnellan, 337. 
29 Donnellan identifies these as ‘descriptions that a user of a name…could always provide and which 
always denote the referent of the name uniquely’ (344), e.g. ‘the entity I had in mind.’  This sort of 
question could always be followed up with another question, e.g. ‘what entity that you had in mind?’ 
15
It is important to note, however, that there is a ‘looseness’ in our language when 
determining the meaning of a name that causes people to think of names in different 
ways, and to associate different and even contradictory descriptions with them; in other 
words, it is practically impossible to compile a complete set of descriptions that everyone 
(or even one person!) would be willing to substitute for a name.   
If we try to present a complete description for the object as the sense of a proper name, odd 
consequences would ensue, e.g. that any true statement about the object using the name as subject 
would be analytic, any false one self-contradictory, that the meaning of the name (and perhaps the 
identity of the object) would change every time there was any change at all in the object, that the 
name would have different meanings for different people, etc.30
But perhaps this problem is not so difficult to remedy; no one said we had to substitute a 
particular description for a name; in real life we often associate a family of descriptions 
with a name.  So with the name ‘Stephen Hawking’ we associate a whole family of
descriptions, including ‘the author of A Brief History of Time,’ ‘the 17th Lucasian 
Professor of Mathematics,’ ‘the winner of the 1982 CBE,’ ‘the husband of Jane Wilde,’ 
etc. that make up the meaning of the name, which we draw upon, depending on our point 
of view, when talking about Stephen Hawking.  
Not all of the descriptions users associate with a name are true, however.  And as 
Strawson writes, 
It would be too much to say that the success of term-introduction within the group by means of the 
name requires that there should exist just one person of whom all the propositions in the 
composite description are true.  But it would not be too much to say that it requires that there 
should exist one and only one person of whom some reasonable proportion of these propositions is 
true.31 
The classic revision of the descriptive theory that takes this factor into account is 
put forth by Searle, who claims that the descriptive force of a statement like ‘This is 
 
30 Searle, ‘Proper Names,’ 169. 
31 Strawson, Individuals, 191-2. 
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Stephen Hawking’ is the assertion ‘that a sufficient but so far unspecified number of 
these statements are true of this object.’32 Although this view lacks the precision of the 
original formulation of the descriptive theory, Searle notes that the 
immense pragmatic convenience of proper names in our language lie precisely in the fact that they 
enable us to refer publicly to objects without being forced to raise issues and come to agreement 
on what descriptive characteristics exactly constitute the identity of the object.  They function…as 
pegs on which to hang descriptions.33 
Prima facie the principle of identifying descriptions, especially as revised by 
Searle, seems like a very realistic, practical way of thinking about what a proper name 
stands for.  However, this does not mean that the descriptive theory is unproblematic.  
Despite the fact that Searle emphasizes the virtues of the looseness of proper names, 
having a solution that is so vague and indeterminate is decidedly unsatisfying (at least 
from a mathematical/logical point of view!).  It lacks the certainty of reference that a 
‘name in the strictly logical sense’ has.  One can still ask: how do I know for certain what 
I am talking about when I utter a name?  Let us look at this problem more closely. 
 
vii. Problems for the descriptive theory 
 
To begin addressing the problems of the descriptive theory, it will be helpful to 
first understand a key idea in philosophical logic.  In logic, types of phrases that are 
particularly suitable for referring to things are called designators.34 ‘Paris’ is a designator 
that refers to Paris.  What Kripke dubbed a rigid designator is a phrase that designates the 
same object in every possible world one can imagine.  The name ‘Stephen Hawking’ 
 
32 Searle, 171. 
33 Searle 172. 
34 Proper names, non-count nouns, singular personal pronouns and definite descriptions are all types of 
designators.; Hodges, 121. 
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designates Stephen Hawking, the man, in all possible worlds (in which he exists)35. A
nonrigid, or ‘accidental’ designator designates something that is not the same in every 
possible world.  ‘The 17th Lucasian Professor of Mathematics’ designates Stephen 
Hawking in this world, but it is possible that Stephen Hawking might not have held the 
position at all, if, say, Cambridge had decided that the position should be awarded to 
Roger Penrose instead.   
Kripke claims that proper names are rigid designators.  The intuition is as follows:  
if a proper name names a unique entity, then that entity should be unique in every 
possible world.  The descriptive theory of naming could be used either to give the 
meaning of the reference, or to determine (or ‘fix’) what the reference is.  If the meaning 
of a name is identical to the family of descriptions associated with it, then the name 
would not be a rigid designator.  This is evident in the preceding example; if ‘Stephen 
Hawking’ was identical to ‘the 17th Lucasian Professor of Mathematics’ it could only be 
considered an accidental designator.  But if the family is just used to help determine the 
reference of the name, as a rough guide to let us know who or what it is that the name is 
talking about, then that object of reference is still the reference in all possible worlds.  In 
the case of Stephen Hawking, the intuition is that the name refers to that man, even 
though he might not have been the 17th Lucasian Professor of Mathematics, or even 
called ‘Stephen Hawking.’  The rigid designation of names allows for identity across all 
possible worlds (or ‘transworld identity’).36 
35 The thought experiment goes like this:  I can conceive of a world where the sky is yellow and the stars 
are green, and ‘Stephen Hawking’ still refers to Stephen Hawking.  I can also conceive of a world where 
Frank and Isobel Hawking  never met and thus Stephen was never born; in this case, the name ‘Stephen 
Hawking’ doesn’t refer to anything at all. 
36 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 48-9. 
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Now we are faced with the problem:  if I can only use this family of descriptions 
as a rough guide to what a proper name stands for, how am I to know for certain what it 
is I am talking about?  Kripke writes:  
Don’t ask: how can I identify this table in another possible world, except by its properties?  I have 
the table in my hands, I can point to it, and when I ask whether it might have been in another 
room, I am talking, by definition, about it…. If I am talking about it, I am talking about it.37 
So, when talking about something we begin with the object we have and can 
identify in front of us in the actual world, and then go on to ask whether or not certain 
things might have been true of that thing in another place and time.38 This is all well and 
good when we have an object, to which we can point and say this is what I am talking 
about, but what if I cannot do this?  The case for using descriptions to determine what a 
name stands for remains very strong.  Let us take a closer look at why Kripke thinks the 
descriptive theory fails. 
Here are the six theses that constitute the descriptive theory of naming39:
1) To every name or designating expression ‘X’, there corresponds a cluster of 
properties, namely the family of those properties S such that A believes ‘SX’. 
2) One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some 
individual uniquely. 
3) If most, or a weighted most, of the S’s are satisfied by one unique object y, then y is 
the referent of ‘X’. 
4) If the vote yields no unique object, ‘X’ does not refer. 
 
37 Kripke, 52-3. 
38 Kripke, 53. 
39 At least these are the theses Kripke says defines the descriptive theory, which can probably be considered 
appropriate, for the present discussion in any case. 
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5) The statement, ‘If X exists, then X has most of the S’s’ is known a priori by the 
speaker. 
6) The statement, ‘If X exists, then X has most of the S’s’ expresses a necessary truth 
(in the idiolect of the speaker). 
Condition for satisfaction of the six theses: For any successful theory, the account must 
not be circular.  The properties which are used in the vote must not themselves involve 
the notion of reference in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminate.40 
viii. Kripke’s objections, and some redeeming points 
 
In this section, I have laid out Kripke’s point-by-point objections to the 
descriptive theory of naming that I have included just above.  I have responded to each of 
his objections with some redeeming points.  
 
1) is merely a definition. 
 
2) Kripke’s objection: This thesis fails to be satisfied if all we know of the thing we are 
naming is not a unique property.41 Imagine that all I know of Maradona is that he was a 
footballer.  I do not believe that ‘was a footballer’ is a property that picks out Maradona 
uniquely.   
 
40 i.e. it must not be ‘question-begging’ 
41 Kripke, 82. 
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On the other hand: just because all I know of Maradona is that he was a footballer does 
not mean that I do not believe there are no properties, or combination of properties that 
pick out Maradona uniquely.  I might simply assume that Maradona has a unique 
combination of properties, some of which I am not aware of. 
 
3) Kripke’s objection: This can also be proved wrong by counterexample.  There are 
individuals that uniquely satisfy properties S, which are not the reference of a name.  For 
example, Columbus is commonly referred to as ‘the first man to discover that the Earth 
was round’, and ‘the person who discovered America’.  Neither description is true, but 
people are not actually referring to the ancient Greek who discovered the Earth was round 
or the Norse explorer who discovered America when they use the name ‘Columbus.’42 
Someone who uses these descriptions is merely misinformed about Columbus. 
 
On the other hand: Although the speaker A might be misinformed about Columbus, if A
subscribes to the descriptive theory, especially as revised by Searle, A might be open to 
the fact that there are other descriptions about Columbus that are true, but that might not 
be known by or accessible to A at that time.  Perhaps at the time of the A’s utterance, no 
one has studied the journals of the Norse explorers to discover that it was they who first 
came upon America.  Although A might believe Columbus to have said properties, A
might still be aware of the possibility that he or she is mistaken about those facts, in 
which case A would still believe that there is a body of properties S of which all or most 
Columbus satisfies uniquely. 
 
42 Kripke, 85. 
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4) Kripke’s objection: This is vulnerable to counterexample, too.  Perhaps the vote (as to 
whether the thing has all or most of the qualities) may not yield any unique object (as in 
2)), and then again it may yield no object.  In this case of yielding no object, it is possible 
to have false beliefs about no one at all.  Although Biblical scholars agree that historically 
no man was swallowed up by a large fish then spat back up to go to Nineveh to preach, 
most still think that Jonah existed, and ‘Jonah’ still has a reference.43 That someone was 
swallowed by a fish and then spat up to go to Nineveh to preach are beliefs true of no one 
(thus the ‘vote’ yields no X).  Yet ‘Jonah’ most likely does refer to some historical figure. 
On the other hand: Using ‘Jonah’ to refer to a rather obscure historical figure is not using 
the name in the same sense as using it to refer to a man who was swallowed up by a 
whale.  It isn’t referring to anyone in the sense that A is thinking of ‘Jonah’.   
 
5) Kripke’s objection: If one is to accept the statement ‘if X exists, then X has most of the 
S’s’, one must believe that ‘X’ has properties S.44 However belief is not the same thing 
as a priori knowledge.45 Kripke’s reasoning on this point is unclear46, but I think this 
might be the sticking point of 5): there must be some reason for my thinking that ‘if X
exists, then X has most of the S’s’.  Why would I think this?  Because my experiences 
have taught me that an X is known by its properties S. If this is the case, then my 
knowledge that X has most of the S’s is a posteriori.
43 Kripke, 86-7. 
44 Kripke, 87. 
45 Ibid. 
46 He merely asserts that ‘…even in a case where (3) and (4) happen to be true, a typical speaker hardly 
knows a priori that they are, as required by the theory.  I think that my belief about [X] is in fact 
correct…But belief hardly constitutes a priori knowledge.’  This simple statement is not enough to explain 
why point 5) might fail. 
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On the other hand: Perhaps this is a too-strict conception of a priori knowledge for this 
situation.  If we think about a priori knowledge in this situation as a basic precept to 
which we can apply situations and then determine whether the statement yields a truth 
value T or F, then the formula ‘X has most of the S’s’ is free from experience, while the 
statement with substituted constituents is subject to experience. 
 
6) Kripke’s objection: Even though Stephen Hawking exists, it is not a necessary truth 
that he is the 17th Lucasian Professor of Mathematics, or that he studied at University 
College, Oxford, or that he married Jane Wilde.  If some other circumstances had arisen, 
none of these things might have been true. 
 
On the other hand: Some of the S’s that pick out X uniquely can be thought of as 
necessary a posteriori. A posteriori necessity is a concept discussed at length by Kripke; 
he notes that there are truths which are necessary, but which we can only know from 
experience.  Take for instance the statement ‘Water is H2O.’  Both ‘Water’ and ‘H2O’ 
are rigid designators that co-refer in the actual world.  This means that they will co-refer 
in every possible world.   However this truth is “knowable only a posteriori because the 
co-reference of the terms is itself contingent.”47 Now consider the statement ‘Stephen 
Hawking is the firstborn son of Frank and Isobel Hawking.’  This statement is necessary, 
at least if we assume that one’s parentage is necessary, but it is only knowable if we have 
experience of the actual world.48 So, perhaps there are a sufficient number of S’s of this 
sort that necessarily pick out X uniquely. 
 
47 Gendler, Tamar Szabo and John Hawthorne, Conceivability and Possibility, 31-2. 
48 Gendler and Hawthorne also use the example of parental origins, although in a slightly different way. 
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ix. Revision: naturalism49 
Kripke seems to think that his objections rule out the descriptive theory of 
naming.  I do not think that these problems are the end of the descriptive theory, though.  
As is evident from my revision of some of Kripke’s points, the descriptive theory is 
sufficient if one takes a more naturalistic approach to language.   
Consider again that A could take into account the fact that his or her belief that X
has properties S might not be true, but could still hold that there is some set of 
descriptions that would pick out X uniquely, if only A had access to the correct 
information.  This sort of view is very reminiscent of Searle’s position on the principle of 
identifying descriptions.  Also, if we take into account the fact that some of the S’s are 
necessary a posteriori, we have a possibility that there is a set of S’s that necessarily pick 
out X uniquely.  Finally, I do not think it is always out of line to include the 
understanding and use of ‘X’ by A as part of the reference X. I think that a reputation, 
composed of a set of properties S, can be built up over time such that it becomes an 
essential part of understanding/picking out X, even if those S’s are not true of X. This 
might lead to ‘question-begging’ descriptions, but such descriptions should be included 
alongside non-question-begging descriptions, to provide a complete picture of X, as X is 
contextualized in this world. 
 
49 In this case I am thinking of naturalism in the artistic/literary sense, in which it denotes realism, i.e. I 
want to look at how language functions in the actual world, without the idealization inherent in the logical 
accounts of naming and reference. 
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x. The causal ‘solution’ 
 
Kripke actually looks to naturalism to address the problem of how is one to 
determine the ‘it’ a name stands for.  In describing the difficulties of the descriptive 
theory of naming, he hopes to point out that there is something fundamentally wrong with 
thinking that we can give ourselves ‘some properties which somehow qualitatively 
uniquely pick out an object and determine our reference in that matter.’   
Kripke notes that some names do conform to the descriptive theory.  For example, 
when a person asserts to him or herself that a name ‘X’ shall designate ‘a unique thing 
with certain identifying properties,’ as when I refer to the person (whoever he might be) 
who anonymously sent me a dozen roses as ‘Secret Admirer.’  Or even when one is 
meeting another person, the descriptive theory could work, says Kripke.  Say that I am 
being introduced to ‘John’ for the first time.  Although I might not usually think in these 
terms, my thoughts (which I might not really be aware of) might identify ‘John’ with the 
description ‘the person I am meeting just now.’  
But in general, he argues, this picture does not fit.  In most cases, we know who 
or what we are talking about ‘not just [based] on what we think ourselves, but on other 
people in the community, the history of how the name reached one, and things like that.  
It is by following such a history that one gets to the reference.’50 Kripke describes the 
reference of a name as being determined at the ‘initial baptism’, when one can actually 
point to a thing, and say ‘this is called “X”’.  This moment of ostension would 
presumably create that unanalyzable bond between a genuine name and its reference, 
whatever that might be.  From this point, others hear the word and intend to use it with 
 
50 Kripke, 95. 
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the same reference as the person he or she heard it from.51 As the name is used in the 
community over time, certain descriptions become associated with it, and these are the 
descriptions that would come to be used in a descriptive theory of naming.   
This means that sometimes the description sketch of how we determine the 
reference is true, as in when one ‘[goes into the privacy of his own room and [says] that 
the referent is to be the unique thing with certain identifying properties,’ as one does 
when one names a new star, or the like, when one can point to a thing and say that is 
what I mean.52 But the fact we cannot always point to the thing that we mean, and the 
fact that we humans are most often incomplete and/or imprecise when we communicate 
both lead to the gaps in the precise descriptive theory of naming that Kripke outlines (e.g. 
how one can come to believe that Columbus first discovered the world was round, etc, 
etc).  
 
xi. Donnellan offers a similar solution 
 
Donnellan is also critical of the descriptive theory, for many of the same reasons 
Kripke is.  He too notices that ‘in general our use of proper names…is parasitic on uses 
of the names by other people – in conversation, written records, etc.  Insofar as we 
possess a set of identifying descriptions in these cases they come from things said about 
the presumed referent by other people.’53 Through time, identifying descriptions go 
 
51 So if I decide that ‘Napoleon’ would be a nice name for my pet aardvark, this does not become a part of 
the general community’s understanding of ‘Napoleon’ (Kripke, 96). 
52 Kripke, 94. 
53 Donnellan, 352. 
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through many levels of ‘parasitic derivation’ as a name is used by person after person, 
which can distort a person’s view of what they are naming.  Additionally, 
The history behind a name may not be known to the individual using it.  I may have forgotten the 
sources from whence I got my descriptions….  Even a whole culture could lose its history.  A 
people with an oral tradition in which names of past heroes figure would probably not be able to 
trace the history back to original sources.54
This does not mean, however, that they are not talking about real people and real exploits.  
Indeed, if one has access to conversations, books and written documents, they can offer a 
means of discovering a referent if one also has knowledge of other historical facts.55 
At the same time, this lost history could be very problematic for the descriptive 
theory if we do not recognize that the lost history is there.  It is this potentially distorting 
history that could account for the fact that a substantial amount of A’s beliefs about X are 
false, or the fact that the properties S accidentally pick out someone or something else 
uniquely, or the fact that X was made up by some person and that the properties S fail to 
uniquely describe anything at all, etc.   
 Donnellan ‘take[s]the principle of identifying descriptions to be a doctrine about 
how reference via proper names must take place.’56 In this he is correct; one really has no 
other way of connecting a name with its reference if one is not in the position of initially 
naming something, for oneself.  His objection to the principle is the idea that it is solely a 
backing of fitting descriptions that connect a name with an object.   
He suggests that we should shift the question we are asking from ‘What is the 
referent?’ to ‘What would the speaker be attributing that predicate to on this occasion?’  
This shift in question takes into account the historical context of a word; it historically, or 
 
54 Donnellan, 352. 
55 Donnellan, 352. 
56 Donnellan, 355. 
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‘causally,’ connects the reference to the speech act.  So, instead of asking ‘Who was the 
teacher of Alexander?’ I might instead acknowledge that on this occasion, thousands of 
years after the episode supposedly occurred, I have been lead by the statements of others 
to attribute the tutelage of Alexander to a man named Aristotle.  
 
xii. Merits of the causal solution 
 
The causal/historical ‘solution’ (Kripke, at least, is reluctant to call it a theory) 
offered by Kripke and Donnellan presents a rather nice picture of how names arise and 
how the references of names, the it or the he or the she, comes to be determined.  It 
captures the rigidity of names; according to the historical/causal theory the reference of a 
name is determined by its actual causal relations, which cannot change across all possible 
worlds.  Indeed, it hints at the idea of a posteriori necessity mentioned in my revision of 
thesis 6). 
The historical/causal theory also seems to be quite useful in terms of 
understanding a proper name.    At least in terms of people, as time progresses, more and 
more descriptions accumulate to describe an individual; one would think that these 
descriptions are very important in understanding what a name stands for.  Maybe at first 
all there is is this new person, who has been named ‘Stephen Hawking.’  But as time goes 
on, more and more things happen that add to a person’s understanding of who he is.  He 
attends Oxford.  He marries Jane Wilde.  He is then named Lucasian Professor of 
Mathematics, and after that he authors A Brief History of Time. Even though these 
properties are contingent, they seem to be an essential part of understanding the man to 
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which the proper name refers.  Though not necessarily a part of the reference of the 
name, these qualities are very important in understanding who the person is in this world.  
I would argue that how people think of a thing is almost as much a part of the reference 
as the thing itself.  This sort of argument gives rise to many questions: what is the role of 
reputation?  Can we say that this is part of the reference itself?  Does a reference extend 
outside of its physical self?  If so, where is the division?  I will return to these questions 




Of course, causal theories are not without disadvantages.  For instance, perhaps 
we do intend to use the name in the same way we heard it.  But I would still ask how are 
we to know what we are talking about, and how are we to know that we succeed in using 
a name in the same way that we heard it?  These so-called causal theories are still vague 
as to the connection between name and reference, and as to the connection between 
persons that causes a name to be used in a certain situation.  The person from whom we 
heard the name must have indicated to us in some way who or what they were referring 
to; in some cases they might have been able to do this by pointing to it and saying ‘that is 
what I mean,’ but in most cases they will indicate, implicitly, the way they are using the 
name by means of descriptions of properties that thing has in this world.  Would not this 
place us back where we started, with the principle of identifying descriptions?  And 
furthermore, what if mistakes in the chain of communication have made it such that the 
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descriptions associated with a name have no connection to the thing it originally named?  
What then are we talking about? 
Evans in particular seems to think that causal theory ignores the context in which 
a speaker uses a name.  The consequence of such a theory, he says, is a speaker S will 
denote one particular thing, no matter how far from that thing the information S 
associates with it in the future is.  Say that at some point there is some confusion that 
leads someone to utter something like ‘Stephen Hawking was a basketball player.’  Say 
also that over time this confused utterance survives, while all true utterances like 
‘Stephen Hawking was the 17th Lucasian Professor of Mathematics’ are lost or forgotten.  
Perhaps it is not the case that this situation it totally unacceptable, but as Evans states: 
‘…notice how little point there is in saying that [S] denotes one [man] rather than any 
other…There is nothing that the speaker is prepared to say or do which relates him 
differentially to that one [man]…The notion of saying [in such a situation] has simply 
been severed from all the connections that made it of interest.’57 
Evans is right to point this out, however it might be useful to qualify his 
argument.  In some cases it seems that there is a point in saying something mistaken.  
Take, for example, the story of Jonah and the whale.  While the events of the Biblical 
story are not true of the historical figure, these new connections are actually what make 
the story of interest.  These new associations have become of great literary and 
theological importance. Furthermore, the author of the story probably knew they were 
twisting the story, using artistic license to better express the message of the story.   
This might be the kind of situation Evans is trying to wrestle with when he asserts 
that we should say that given the context in which S finds himself, S’s ‘dispositions’ are 
 
57 Evans, ‘The Causal Theory of Names,’ 317. 
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bent towards one particular thing, ‘whose states and doings alone he would count as 
serving to verify remarks made in that context using the name.’58 That context could 
persist, or it could ‘disappear so that the speaker is simply not sensitive to the outcome of 
any investigations regarding the truth of what he is said to have said.’59 Evans argues 
that to take the context of the speaker into account, one should ask:  ‘who are they 
believing about?’ versus ‘who is the original bearer of the name?’ as the causal theory 
would.  The aim in doing this, he says, is to restore the connection between strict truth 
conditions and the beliefs/interests of the user.  It might be interesting to discover where a 
name we use in conversation today originated, but often we will find that this causal 
origin is not critical in a speaker’s familiarity with and use of a name.   Consider the 
following example:  two boys are born on the same day in the same hospital to different 
mothers.  One is named ‘Stephen’ and one is named ‘Jack.’  Unwittingly, a nurse 
switches the babies.  For the rest of their lives, Stephen is known as ‘Jack’, and Jack as 
‘Stephen.’  In such a situation ‘the intentions of the speakers to use the name to refer to 
something must be allowed to count in determination of what it denotes,’60 i.e. that the 
mother of Jack intends to refer to her son.  Thus since Stephen is raised as her son, ‘Jack’ 
should come to denote Stephen.  However we are in need of some sort of solution that 
will enable reference change (like ‘Stephen’ and ‘Jack’) and yet not make ‘Stephen’ 
actually name Jack or ‘Goliath’ actually name the Philistine killed by David.61 
The real problem of naming, Evans reminds us, lies in a thing’s having to fit a
family of descriptions (at least for strict descriptivists like Frege and Russell), and being 
 
58 Evans, 317. 
59 Evans, 317. 
60 Evans, 319. 
61 Historians believe David to have killed a Philistine, but not the one called ‘Goliath.’ 
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causally isolated from the community of the user.  But Evans thinks Kripke has 
‘mislocated the causal relation’; he states that the important causal relation is ‘between 
that item’s states and doings and the speaker’s body of information—not between the 
item’s being dubbed with a name and the speaker’s contemporary use of it.’62 Thus, 
Evans proposes that ‘[a] speaker will have referred to a…only if he has succeeded in 
getting it across that Fa63 [emphasis added]…One may refer to x by using a description 
that x does not satisfy; one that may not thus denote x’64 In getting it across that Fa, the 
audience will have formed some belief, although not necessarily the belief the speaker 
intended to say.  The actual item is not in general the satisfier of the body of information 
possessed by the speaker (which makes it true that S knows of x); rather, x is causally, or 
dominantly, responsible for speaker’s possession of the body of information. 
‘A cluster or dossier [or family, as we have called it] of information can be 
dominantly of an item though it contains elements whose source is different…persistent 
misidentification can bring it about that a cluster is dominantly of some item other than 
that it was dominantly of originally.’65 Say I meet one of a pair of identical twins, 
‘Thelma.’  I only know Thelma superficially when she and her twin ‘Louise’ decide to 
play a prank and switch places.  Being none the wiser, I get to be better friends with 
Louise thinking she is called ‘Thelma.’  When they first make the switch, the ‘dossier’ of 
information I associate with Louise is dominantly of the wrong person (since up to this 
point I have only known Thelma), but gradually my dossier becomes dominantly of the 
right person, as I get to know Louise (‘Thelma’) better.  Evans states: ‘in the case of 
 
62 Evans, 319. 
63 Fa is a description in the form of a function, in which a (the referent) is F (some predicate, e.g. x is a 
Floridian). 
64 Evans, 320. 
65 Evans, 321. 
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persons…each man’s life presents a skeleton and the dominant source may be the man 
who contributed to covering most of it [emphasis added] rather than the man who 
contributed most of the covering…I think we can say that in general a speaker intends to 
refer to the item that is the dominant source of his associated body of information.’66 
Thus in the case of Stephen and Jack, when I say ‘Jack’ I will be referring to the person 
who was originally dubbed ‘Stephen,’ but who now after a lifetime of being referred to as 
‘Jack’ is by no means essentially tied to the name ‘Stephen.’  That name can now be 
thought of as truly referring to the boy who was originally named ‘Jack.’ 
Tentatively, Evans summarizes his solution as “NN” is a name of x in a 
community C if 1) it is common knowledge that members of C have in their repertoire 
the procedure of using “NN” to refer to x (with the intention of referring to x); and 2) the 
success of reference in any particular case is intended to rely on common knowledge 
between speaker and hearer that “NN” has been used to refer to x by members of C and 
not upon common knowledge of the satisfaction by x of some predicate embedded in 
“NN.”67 Basically we use a name because we know we use it, versus using a name based 
on some essential, unanalysable connection between name and reference that was made 
at a moment of ‘initial baptism.’  
‘This distinction is just what is needed to distinguish dead from living metaphors’ 
writes Evans.  In this case, acknowledgement of another’s intention among speakers in a 
community and recognition of the need for a mode of communication is what separates 
names from descriptions; compare this view with that of Kripke, for whom a name is a 
name just because someone says it is so (i.e. the act of dubbing).  If we get rid of the idea 
 
66 Evans, 321. 
67 Evans, 322. 
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that there is a standard way of naming, says Evans, ‘users will not in general use the 
name under any view as to its origin, and therefore when there is a divergence between 
the item involved in the name’s origin and the speakers’ intended reference there will be 
no misapprehension, no bar to the name’s acquiring a new denotation…’68 
Also, we can use names with the ‘overriding intention to conform to the use made 
of them by some other persons…we use the expression deferentially (with respect to 
[some] other person or group of persons).’69 Such an intention displays recognition of a 
community by a speaker as well; although a speaker might have her own opinion as to 
whom or what is named by “NN,” she might recognize that she (or the community) could 
be mistaken in some way about the referent of “NN” and thus simply intend to refer to 
whomever/whatever the other participants in the conversation are intending to refer to, 
simply to put herself on the same page as the rest of the community, to at least try to talk 
about the same thing.  Deferentially using a name highlights that there is a difference 
between a) intending to refer to the S and believing that a = the S, and b) intending to 
refer to a.70 
As Evans shows, referring can produce a lot of logical falsehood when we are tied 
strictly to a descriptive or causal theory; x might not be the referent of “NN” because it 
does not fit the family of descriptions associated with it, or because the causal chain has 
been so warped by miscommunication or other events (e.g. the unbeknownst switching of 
persons) that a name is no longer associated with that x on which it was originally 
bestowed. Yet Evans concludes that his position, which says that the information 
 
68 Evans, 323. 
69 Evans, 323. 
70 Evans, 324. 
34
associated with a name is dominantly of some x, and that the use of that name should be 
recognized as used in a community, could at least partially vindicate both theories.   
It supports the theory or identifying descriptions by acknowledging that 
denotation is largely determined by description, but it determines the cluster of 
descriptions by causal origin.  The idea of dominance replaces the idea of simple 
fulfillment of a ‘majority of descriptions’ or the ‘degree of fit.’  By so including the 
causal/historical nature in which a family of descriptions arises and the rigidity of names, 
it can also appease the causal theorists.71 
* * *
Sainsbury, another critic of the causal/historical position, further developed 
Evans’s intuition that the context and community in which a name is used is of the utmost 
importance in determining what one is talking about.  Essentially, proper names are a 
social tool; they help in the sharing of information through use and interpretation.  We 
must note that because of the human-use nature of names, ‘some but not all subsequent 
events which are uses of a name are related to the baptism72, and to each other, by a 
relation which ensures that they belong to the same practice.’73 In this ‘same-practice’ 
relation, a name is used by a community to refer to the same thing.  But how is it that a 
name is initiated into such a practice?   
 
71 Evans, 325. 
72 Sainsbury’s idea of baptism includes object-related baptisms (like Kripke’s), but also ‘empty baptisms’ 
in which the baptizer believes there to be some such object when there actually is not, or inadvertent 
baptisms, when a name comes to be used for something unintentionally (like a nickname, assuming it 
comes about spontaneously, without any forethought). 
73 Sainsbury, Reference without Referents, 111-12; by ‘practice’ Sainsbury means a kind of use, or a use 
with a certain intention, in a community. 
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Sainsbury breaks the answer to the ‘how?’ question into two parts: the initiation 
relation (of the original, earlier use to a later use), and the continuing-participation 
relation (in which an earlier and a later use belong to same practice by virtue of being 
used by same user).  ‘A use…can be either a production of the name or an understanding 
of a production.’74 These ideas derive from Kripke, but a point of difference in 
Sainsbury’s picture is that he tries to address the connection between a practice and its 
referent.  For all that has been said, a practice might have no referent, more than one, 
might change referent over time, or might change from empty to non-empty or 
conversely.  For Kripke, by contrast, each practice has just one referent, and this fact is 
built into the very idea of a practice.75 He claims that a name-using practice retains its 
baptism’s referent, preserved by the same-practice relation.  Thus, adhering to Kripke’s 
view would mean that we would have to reject Evans’s claim that a name-using practice 
can undergo reference change.  However as we have seen it is entirely plausible that a 
speaker’s (or even a community’s) use of a name could have no meaningful connection to 
its original referent.  Consequently, we should look more closely at this idea of a practice. 
According to Sainsbury, a new user of a name enters a ‘practice’ by resolving to 
use that name in the same way as another, whose use of it belongs to that practice 
(whatever it may be).  Whether or not an event (use) is ‘initiated’ into a practice P 
depends in part on the future events: if it causes a chain of uses in which the user’s 
referent coincides with the semantic referent of P, the event (a new user’s use) is a first 
 
74 Sainsbury, 112. 
75 Sainsbury, 112-13. 
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participation in P.76 If it causes a chain of uses in which the speaker’s referent and the 
semantic referent of P diverge, the event is the initiation of a new practice, PW. 77 
To see how a use can either become a part of a practice or initiate a new practice, 
reflect on the following illustration78: I am standing on a point from which I can see two 
prominent mountains, c and d. A local from the nearby village points to c, telling me it is 
called Pisgah.  I take him to have pointed to d, above which floats the only cloud in the 
sky.  If I then say, ‘there is a cloud above Pisgah,’ I manifestly intend to use the name 
‘Pisgah’ as the locals use it (for c), but I intend to use ‘Pisgah’ for d. If the local then 
realizes my mistake and corrects my understanding of which mountain is referred to by 
‘Pisgah,’ I can be initiated into the locals’ practice of the name ‘Pisgah,’ since my use 
now coincides with that semantic referent of ‘Pisgah.’  Say, though, that before the local 
can correct my mistake a freak avalanche sweeps through the village, killing everyone 
except for (miraculously) me.  I then travel to another town, where I tell everyone that d
is named ‘Pisgah.’  My use catches on; the semantic referent of this new practice is d,
whereas if the local had a chance to correct me, I would have initiated this new village 
into the practice of the other village and the semantic referent would be c.
Hence to be a part of a practice, a name need not have certain special information 
associated with it (like X has to have all or most of the properties S).  All that is required 
is that someone ‘acquire[s] the disposition to use the name with a speaker referent that 
aligns with its semantic referent.’79 If the speaker and semantic referent diverge, it is not 
 
76 Even if there is actually a divergence between the speaker and semantic referent; this would just be an 
error. 
77 Sainsbury, 114. 
78 Used by Sainsbury, 114-15. 
79 Sainsbury, 116. 
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too late to be initiated into a practice so long as the possibility remains for the speaker to 
be corrected by some member of the practice.80 
Once one is part of a practice, one continues his or her participation in that 
practice by intending to ‘go on as before.’  Basically, Sainsbury says, ‘continuity of 
participation should deliver continuity of reference,’ in which speaker and semantic 
reference coincide.  People usually distinguish practices by means of different sets of 
associated information.  ‘In general a later use by a subject continues the subject’s 
participation in a certain practice only if it is sensitive to information from an earlier use 
in the same practice,’ he writes.  Information is associated with a name at the initiation 
into a practice, and some of this information is also associated in the second, third, and 
later uses.81 All the information can be deleted from people’s associations over time, and 
the associated information can deviate somewhat, but ‘our verdict should not lead to a 
prolonged and robust divergence between speaker referent and semantic referent.’  Such 
persistent misidentification would lead to a new practice.82 
At first blush it appears that Sainsbury would concur with Evans’s position that a 
practice can change referents over time, as a use is warped through communicative acts 
between speakers.  However, Sainsbury thinks that in a case such as Evans presents (baby 
‘Jack’ switched at birth) is not a case of reference change, but of an unwitting baptism; 
clearly that baby is not the original Jack, but after a significant amount of time people are 
clearly not mistaken in referring to that child as ‘Jack,’ as by that point the information 
people associate with that use of the name coincides with the ‘mistaken’ Jack.  While 
Evans takes the reference to have changed, Sainsbury argues that it is the practice that 
 
80 Assuming he or she is ‘in the know’! 
81 Note that it is not essential that a referent fulfill a set of information. 
82 Sainsbury, 117-18.  
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has changed; both agree that in the long run the speaker and the semantic referents will 
have to coincide, but they disagree on how this concurrence comes about.  While both 
would agree that the mother of ‘Jack’ has failed to ‘go on as before,’ that fact, Sainsbury 
thinks, is reason to think that the first practice has been discontinued.  In the case of 
Pisgah, if the other village had not been wiped out, there could have been two co-existing 
practices.   
I agree with Sainsbury that intuitively his proposal makes more sense; it is more 
natural to say that the way in which we use a name has changed if the name comes to 
refer to something new.  If we are to follow in his line of thinking, it would mean that 
each practice has at most one referent; thus different practices makes for different uses of 
a single (syntactic) name (i.e. one syntactic referent with two speaker referents).  
Sainsbury also points out that you cannot tell immediately if a new practice has 
originated in any given situation; rather it will depend on what happens regarding the 
semantic and speaker referents in the future (e.g. the changeling ‘Jack’ could be switched 
back the next day, as opposed to having the mix-up perpetuated for the lifetime of the 




The context and use of a name are of the greatest importance in determining the 
‘it’ that a proper name stands for.  We have seen the inevitable problems caused by 
purely logical accounts of naming.  When we adhere to strict descriptivist views like 
 
83 Sainsbury, 121. 
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Frege and Russell, or strict causal theories like Kripke, we are left with (respectively) 
either a situation where there are too many/no referents of a proper name, or (often times) 
a situation in which the referent of the name we are using is, for all meaningful purposes, 
disconnected from the way in which we are using it.  Consequently, theories like those of 
Searle, Evans and Sainsbury that account for different understandings and uses of names 
by social human beings are better ways of thinking about proper names. 
Some philosophers would consider solutions like those of Searle, Evans or 
Sainsbury as epistemologically inadequate in regards to their determinateness or 
truthfulness—or rather their “deficiencies” in those areas.  Yet I believe that such 
positions demonstrate recognition of the simple fact that language is a human 
construction that is by no means a perfect representation of the construction of the natural 
world.  Language is a useful tool, but as an artifice there are limits on its ability to 
provide information.   
If we take this into account, it is appropriate that we should factor how we 
ordinarily figure out what a name stands for into our theory of proper names.  Remember 
that if I want to identify for a friend who ‘Stephen Hawking’ is, I will ordinarily appeal to 
a dossier of information, a family of descriptions if you will, that I understand to pick out 
that being uniquely. Accordingly, I think that we should rely on a modified descriptive 
theory to best describe how we are to determine what a name names, in hope of 
remaining as true to our actual actions as possible.   
Of course, we cannot adhere to a strict theory of definite descriptions.  A 
descriptive theory such as Searle’s, however, works very well.  If we allow ‘that a 
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sufficient but so far unspecified number of these statements are true of [some] object,’84 
we account for the possibility that some of the information we possess is wrong, and for 
the possibility that new information could come to be true of that object.  As I stated 
earlier, such a view recognizes that a reasonable speaker A would take into consideration 
the fact that his or her belief that X has properties S might not be true, but could still hold 
that there is some set of descriptions that would pick out X uniquely, if only A had access 
to the correct information.   
We must also take include the context in which a name is used in our picture of 
proper names.  If we are to claim that there is some family of descriptions of which a 
sufficient yet so far unspecified number are true of the referent, we need a picture of how 
this family came to be associated with a name.  A causal picture like that of Kripke or 
Sainsbury serves this purpose nicely; upon  reflection, it appears that there must be some 
reason for associating a description with a name.  Ostension85 and subsequent causal 
relationships (including misunderstanding) would be a sufficient explanation of how we 
come to associate certain descriptions with a name.  A family of descriptions can only be 
built through direct experience with a thing, or through communication of experiences 
among people.   
If we accept this sketch of how a family of descriptions comes to be associated 
with a name, we have to think about what we are actually referring to: is it the original 
object of ostension or ‘baptism,’ as it is for Kripke?  Evans was right to argue that in 
many cases this would make using a name pointless; if I am talking about ‘Jonah’ or 
 
84 Searle, 171. 
85 Of some unique entity, be it visible or not 
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‘Jack’ or ‘Pisgah’ (in the second village) or any other thing in which we know86 that the 
current understanding of the name is not in line with the original bearer of the name, 
there is no point in saying that I am actually talking about the historical Jonah or original 
‘Jack’ or mountain c or whatever.   
If we are not talking about the original object of baptism, what is it that we are 
referring to?  Intuitively it makes sense to take a position like Evans or Sainsbury, who 
would argue that it is that thing which the majority of the descriptions are actually of in 
the context of a certain use.  Again, such a view would allow for the evolution of names, 
which is a key part of their usefulness in communication.  Furthermore, it could still 
capture the rigidity of names if we consider the fact that some of the S’s are necessary a
posteriori, which leaves us with the possibility that there is a set of S’s that necessarily 
pick out X uniquely, all things being such that they happened as they did, such that those 
descriptions came to be associated with that object87, which ties that name necessarily to 
that object. 
This picture is very appealing to one’s ordinary sensibilities.  Yet it leaves a major 
problem that will not be easy to remedy: fulfillment.  Maybe a name names a physical 
thing that fulfills a sufficient number of propositions.  But it does not seem to me that a 
name must be purely object-related.  I would agree with Russell that we describe things 
that are real, whether it is an object, a figment of the imagination, or something else that 
is not concrete (just because an object is not concrete does not make it any less real!).  It 
is just as probable that a name names an idea or an imagination or a concept that people 
hold in common.  This kind of referent can also fulfill a set of descriptions.   
 
86 Either from historical investigation or as an omniscient third party 
87 I am thinking of an object in Russell’s sense, i.e. it can be a physical thing, a figment of the imagination 
or something else that is not concrete. 
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Whatever the nature of a name’s referent, my initial feeling is that a unique entity 
does not need to necessarily fulfill that set of descriptions for it to be the referent of a 
name.  I mentioned earlier that I think that how people think of a thing can be as much a 
part of the reference as the physical thing itself. This feeling leads me to think that it 
might not be out of line to include the understanding and use of ‘X’ by A as part of the 
reference X. A reputation, composed of a set of properties S, can be built up over time 
such that it becomes an essential part of understanding/picking out X by members of a 
community, even if those S’s are not true of X. Such descriptions should be included in 
the family of descriptions, to provide a complete picture of X, as X is contextualized in 
this world.   
For instance, say some famous politician has the reputation of being a particularly 
upstanding citizen.  In fact, he takes bribes, cheats on his taxes, and indulges in various 
sensual pleasures.  However, he is careful to conceal such actions from his constituents 
with the help of his public relations team; he goes around shaking hands, kissing babies, 
and expounding various family values (which of course he supports with carefully crafted 
‘personal’ anecdotes).  Indeed he does not fulfill the description ‘an upstanding citizen’ 
(and all of the descriptions associated with this statement), yet this reputation is an 
essential part of identifying who politician X is, and those descriptions should be included 
in the family of identifying properties.  Perhaps we could qualify such descriptions in the 
manner of ‘the X that most users believe/associate with the property S’.  Such 
descriptions are ‘question-begging,’ but then again they are needed to provide the most 
comprehensive mode of identifying an X as possible. 
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This example is rather extreme, but its purpose is to show that a reference and its 
“reputation” as I have called it work together to pick out X uniquely.  But this sort of 
picture gives rise to many questions: what is the role of reputation (i.e. how a community 
thinks about a thing)?  Can we say that this is part of the reference itself?  Does a 
reference extend outside of its physical self, and if so, where is the division?  When is an 
untrue proposition part of a reference, and when is it not?     
Reflection on these questions lead me to reverse my earlier intuition, that perhaps 
we should include the understanding and use of ‘X’ by A as part of the reference X. 
Rather, I think it better to think of a reputation as a non-concrete reference in itself. The 
beliefs of the using community should fulfill the descriptions associated with it (the 
‘object’ of reference is composed of descriptions, which are fulfilled by people’s 
believing them88).  This non-concrete reference, this reputation (e.g. politician X’s 
reputation), is better thought of as a supplement to the reference (e.g. a supplement to 
‘politician X’) that has been created by the causal chains of communication associated 
with that reference.  To maintain as much strictness as possible in our picture of what a 
name names, we should not say that properties S are fulfilled by X if those properties are 
untrue of X. In other words, we should not think of a (concrete) reference as extending 
outside of its physical self.89 It would be very useful for explaining our understanding, 
though, if we allowed that for each name there is one or more ideas (which would include 
reputations) of that name, created by causal chains of communication, that are themselves 
 
88Admittedly, this idea seems to be self-fulfilling 
89 At least for concrete references; in the case of abstract references (e.g. ideas, figments of the imagination) 
the idea of a reputation is not as relevant.  Such abstract objects of reference do not run into the problem of 
fulfillment in the same way as concrete ones, as the uses/practices of such names are much more 
particularized and individual.  Essentially the descriptions associated with such objects are fulfilled by a 
person’s believing them, since descriptions are what constitute such objects.  I  feel that uses/practices of 
such names might be unique to each person, in light of the fact that our knowledge of what is in other 
people’s minds is limited. 
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objects that could be picked out by a name in the form of ‘community C’s view of that 
thing that is named “X”.’   
xv. A final note 
Where are we left now?  What of Romeo, or Kumari and the girl whom the 
goddess has abandoned, whom I mentioned in the introduction? 
An essential part of Kumari is that she shifts physical bodies: when she abandons 
one girl, she inhabits another.  Whoever the girl is seems to be of minor importance; since 
Kumari’s physical body changes from time to time, the descriptions associated with her 
will primarily be of the deity, and never dominantly of any of the girls she inhabits.  
And as for Juliet’s question, ‘What’s “Montague?”’: it may be nor hand, nor foot, 
nor any other part belonging to a man, but it is a sign of his self in context; it is an 
expression of his relation to other people in a community.  Had things been otherwise, 
Romeo could have been called by a different name.  But that name would still be 
necessarily connected with all those factors that prevent him and Juliet from being 
together.  A posteriori, things being such as they are, Romeo is essentially connected to 
that name.  If he were of some other name suddenly, and somehow magically not 
historically connected to how his name came about, then perchance Romeo could, free 
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